Commerce Versus Culture: The Battle between the United States and the European Union over Audiovisual Trade Policies by Garrett, Lisa L.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 19 | Number 3 Article 6
Summer 1994
Commerce Versus Culture: The Battle between the
United States and the European Union over
Audiovisual Trade Policies
Lisa L. Garrett
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lisa L. Garrett, Commerce Versus Culture: The Battle between the United States and the European Union over Audiovisual Trade Policies, 19
N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 553 (1993).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol19/iss3/6
Commerce Versus Culture: The Battle between the United States and the
European Union over Audiovisual Trade Policies
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This comments is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation:
http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol19/iss3/6
Commerce versus Culture: The Battle Between the
United States and the European Union Over
Audiovisual Trade Policies
I. Introduction
After seven long years, the Uruguay Round of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade' (GATT) came to a close on December 15,
1993. For the first time in trade history, there is an agreement between
member countries to deregulate trade in services and to incorporate
services into the globally-managed framework of the GATTF.2 The Uru-
guay Round negotiations, named for their beginning in Punta del Este,
Uruguay, were on the verge of collapse, however, until the United
States and the European Union 3 agreed to sideline their long, bitter
dispute over audiovisuals.4
The "agreement to disagree" between the United States and the
European Union forcibly removed the audiovisual sector from the
Uruguay Round negotiations. 5 On December 13, 1993, Mickey Kan-
tor, the United States Trade Representative, contacted President Bill
Clinton to obtain permission to remove audiovisuals from the negotiat-
ing table.6 President Clinton stated that removing audiovisuals from
the GATT negotiations was "certainly better than leaving a weak agree-
ment intact or catering the whole round over it, because there's just
too much aggregate economic benefit to the United States from the
1 This agreement was originally created in 1948 as an interim agreement to regulate
trade relations until a proposed international trade organization could be established. The
agreement has accomplished its original purpose and has gone on to serve as the principle
multilateral instrument governing international trade. The primary goal of the agreement is
to liberalize international commerce by establishing rules to reduce national trade barriers
and other measures that distort competition between nations. Jon Filipek, "Culture Quotas":
The Trade Controversy over the European Community's Broadcasting Directive, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L.
323, 337 (1992).
2 Edward Luce, High Price of Accord in Services Package - GATT Agreement, GuARDtAN, Dec.
15, 1993, at 12.
3 The Maastricht Treaty, which became effective on November 1, 1993, provides that
the European Community be renamed the European Union. See Maastricht Treaty on Polit-
ical Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 255 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1993) [hereinafter
Maastricht Treaty].
4 Robert Dodge, Victory Within Sight for Global Trade Treaty Deadline Today for GATT Com-
pletion, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Dec. 15, 1993, at Al.
5 See Luce, supra note 2.
6 Clinton Says Emerging Uruguay Round Pact is in US. Interest Despite Shortcomings, Int'l
Trade Daily (BNA), at D5 (Dec. 16, 1993).
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overall tariff reductions to not try to keep the round intact."7 Seven
years of negotiations on audiovisuals had failed miserably.
Although it appeared better to remove audiovisuals from the Uru-
guay Round negotiations than to not finalize an agreement before the
December 15, 1993 deadline,8 the implications of the withdrawal are
grave. The withdrawal enables the European Union's protectionist au-
diovisual trade policies to remain intact and presents the United States
with the decision of whether to resort to measures to resolve its audi-
ovisuals dispute with the European Union.
After a statement of the issue in Part II, this Comment will detail
applicable European Union law and trade policies and highlight im-
portant developments in the Uruguay Round negotiations in Part III.
Part IV of the Comment will discuss and evaluate the European
Union's classification of audiovisual products as "cultural products,"
the European Union's motive in enacting its audiovisual trade policies,
the European Union's legal authority to enact trade policies in the
name of cultural protection, and the measures that the United States
could employ to end its audiovisuals dispute with the European Union.
In light of the discussion and evaluations, the Comment will assert in
Part V that: 1) the European Union's classification of audiovisual
products can be maintained; 2) the European Union enacted its audio-
visual trade policies to protect its market from American domination;
3) the European Union has no authority to enact trade initiatives in
the name of cultural protection; and 4) the United States should settle
the audiovisuals dispute by pursuing unresolved bilateral negotiations
regarding the Television Without Frontiers Directive9 and pursuing a
definitive resolution of the scope of Article IV of the GATT.1 0
II. Statement of the Issue
During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the audiovisuals dispute
between the United States and the European Union centered around
both the proper classification of the audiovisual sector and the legiti-
macy of one of the European Union's most controversial audiovisual
policies.
The United States and the European Union classify the audiovi-
sual sector differently. The United States defines audiovisual products
7 1d.
8 December 15, 1993 was the deadline by which President Clinton had to secure a final
agreement. President Clinton's congressionally granted authority to negotiate was set to ex-
pire on that date. Dodge, supra note 4.
9 The Directive was adopted by the Council of European Communities on October 3,
1989 and became effective on October 3, 1991. Council Directive 89/552 of 3 October 1989
on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down By Law, Regulation or Administrative
Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities, 1989
OJ. (L 298) 23. See Peter Goodwin, The Indefinite Article - Countries Interpret EC Rules on Foreign
TV in Different Ways, BRoAD AST, Feb. 5, 1993, at 24.
10 See infra note 131 and accompaning text.
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in economic terms; the audiovisual industry is a commercial venture.
Additionally, the United States asserts that films and television are
commercial products sold on the market. Therefore, the audiovisual
sector should be fully covered by the GATT and subject to the free
trade principles covering services which were being incorporated into
the final agreement.11
Conversely, the European Union classifies audiovisual products as
"cultural products." Therefore, trade in audiovisual products cannot
be treated the same as trade in other products or services.1 2 Specifi-
cally, the European Union envisions television programs and films as
"art of their culture."13 Unlike "grain or olives, programs and films are
intrinsic to the culture of nations or continents" 14 and cannot be left
to market forces.
The dispute between the United States and the European Union
also centered around the legitimacy of one of the European Union's
most controversial audiovisual trade policies: the Television Without
Frontiers Directive. The United States formally challenged the legiti-
macy of the Directive by requesting bilateral consultations under Arti-
cle XXII15 of the GATT with nations that had signed the Television
Convention, 16 and also by lodging a complaint under Article XXII of
the GATT requesting bilateral consultations with the European
Union. 17 The United States simultaneously threatened to take retalia-
tory action against Union exports if quotas were adopted under the
Directive.18 The United States asserted that attempts to distort the
market with quotas and rules were unacceptable.1 9
Despite efforts to resolve the disagreement over the legitimacy of
11 EC, US. Agreement on Audiovisuals Said Limited; More Negotiations Needed, Int'l Trade
Daily (BNA)(Oct. 15, 1993).
12 I&
13 Marta Wohrle, Battle of the Baniers-Trade in TV Programs Between USA and Europe,
BROADCAST, Feb. 5, 1993, at 23.
14 J&
15 See U.S. INr'L TRADE COMM'N 1992: THE EFFErs OF GREATER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
WITHIN THE EuRoP.EN COMMUNITY ON THE UNITED STATES: FitsT FoLLow-UP REPORT 6-114
(1990) (describing the United States' challenge to the Television Without Frontiers Directive
under the GATT in October of 1989). Article XXII of the GATT provides:
Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to and shall af-
ford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as
may be made by any other contracting party with respect to the operation of
customs regulations and formalities, anti-dumping, and countervailing duties,
quantitative and exchange regulations, subsidies, state-trading operations, sani-
tary laws and regulations for the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health, and generally all matters affecting the operation of the Agreement.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 266, art. XXII (1950).
16 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
17 Clint Smith, International Trade in Television Programming and GATT An Analysis of
Why the European Community's Local Program Requirement Violates the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw. 97, 106 (1993).
18 Id.; see infra note 47 and text accompanying notes 47-48.
19 Wohrle, supra note 13.
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the Directive, the first consultation failed.20 Instead of requesting
more consultations or taking retaliatory actions, the United States
chose to resolve the disagreement through the Uruguay Round
negotiations.
Unfortunately, the Uruguay Round negotiations did not resolve
the bitter audiovisuals dispute between the United States and the Euro-
pean Union. The only agreement reached on audiovisuals was an
"agreement to disagree." This agreement forced the removal of the
audiovisual sector from the Uruguay Round negotiations 21 and kept
the European Union's protectionist audiovisual trade policies intact.
This result is significant for four reasons. First, the European Union's
classification of its audiovisual products as "cultural products" is ques-
tionable. Second, even if audiovisual products could be considered
"cultural products," it is questionable whether the European Union en-
acted its audiovisual trade policies to protect its "culture" or to protect
its markets from further United States domination. Third, the Euro-
pean Union apparently has no legal authority to implement trade ini-
tiatives in the name of cultural protection. Finally, the United States
must now determine what measures it should pursue in order to bring
about a resolution to the audiovisuals dispute.
III. Background Law & Negotiations
A. European Union Law
The European Union functions according to the rules established
by the Treaty of Paris signed on April 18, 1951, the two Treaties of
Rome signed on March 25, 1957, and the Treaty on European Union
signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992.22 The Treaty of Rome cre-
ated the European Economic Community23 and enumerated the vari-
ous powers of that body. The Treaty of Rome does not give European
Union institutions the authority to foster cultural initiatives in any
area.24 The Treaty of Rome does contain, however, a generic neces-
sary powers provision. Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome affords the
European Union necessary powers that were not explicitly mentioned
in the Treaty.2 5 Because the Treaty of Rome does not give Union insti-
20 Smith, supra note 17, at 107.
21 See Luce, supra note 2.
22 EC Institutions and the Decision Making Process, COOPERS & LYBRAND EC COMMENTARIES,
Dec. 16, 1993.
23 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY], Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 1 [herinafter Treaty of Rome].
24 Richard Collins, The Screening of Jacques Tati: Broadcasting and Cultural Identity in the
European Community, 11 CARiozo ARTS & ENT. L.J., 361, 370 (1993).
25 Id. at n.40. Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome states:
[i]f action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of
the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community
and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the As-
sembly, take the appropriate measures.
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tutions the authority to foster cultural initiatives, any "pure" cultural
initiative would have to take place under the generic necessary powers
of Article 235.26
The absence of a true cultural provision in the Treaty of Rome
caused some member states to push for a revision of the Treaty.2 7
Such efforts culminated in the inclusion of a culture article in the
Maastricht Treaty on Political Union.28 The Maastricht Treaty ac-
knowledges that culture is an integral part of the European Union and
creates a new advisory body to effectuate cultural initiatives. Specifi-
cally, Article 198a of the Maastricht Treaty provides for the creation of
the Committee of Regions.2 9 This committee will consist of represent-
atives from regional and local bodies and will have an advisory status
within the European Union's decision-making process. 30 It will issue
advice on culture as well as other areas such as health and trans-Euro-
pean transport networks.31 Because the Maastricht Treaty came into
effect on November 1, 1993, it had no impact upon the Uruguay
Round negotiations.3 2
The fact that the European Union does not have any express au-
thority to effectuate cultural initiatives under the Treaty of Rome has
not prevented it from erecting a comprehensive audiovisual policy
framework that embraces cultural preservation as one of its underlying
precepts. 33
B. European Union Trade Policies
Over time, the European Union has erected a comprehensive au-
diovisual policy framework. A Commission Communication dated May
1986 outlined the need for an action program for the European
Union's audiovisual products industry. 34 The action program would
encompass film and television production, distribution, and funding. 35
The action program, entitled Measures to Encourage the Development
of Industry of Audiovisual Production ("MEDIA 92"), was launched in
November 1986, and was based on some of the priorities outlined in
Treaty of Rome, supra note 23, art. 235.
26 See Collins, supra note 24, at 370. This statement is accurate until cultural initiatives
can be rightfully enacted under the Maastricht Treaty. See also infra text accompanying note
28.
27 See Collins, supra note 24, at 370-71.
28 Id. at 371. The Maastricht Treaty was signed on February 7, 1992 and became effec-
tive on November 1, 1993. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 3.
29 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 3, at 300.
30 EC Institutions and the Decision Making Process, supra note 22.
31 1&
32 See infra text accompanying notes 128-30.
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the 1986 Commission Communication.3 6
Through three phases, the MEDIA 92 program was to find ways of
providing economic support to the Union's film and television indus-
tries with the goal of making them more competitive in the interna-
tional market.3 7 Phase I, which occurred in 1987, involved the
consultation of industry, accompanied by in-depth market studies in
the production and distribution sectors.3 8 Phase II, which lasted from
1988-90, consisted of a pilot experimental phase based on the consulta-
tions and studies undertaken during phase I.39
In December 1990, the third phase of the MEDIA 92 action pro-
gram was adopted and renamed MEDIA 95. 40 MEDIA 95, which cov-
ers the years 1991-95, is the product of the initiatives pursued during
phases I and II of MEDIA 92. 41 Its purpose is to ensure that the
achievements and guidelines that emerged during phase II are real-
ized on a significant scale and are supplemented where necessary by
collaboration with the audiovisual EUREKA initiative, which encour-
ages the development of a strong European audiovisual market and
the formation of common policies for the purchase and production of
programs among pubic and private-sector television channels.42
MEDIA 95's first priority is distribution, given that "eighty percent
of [EU] films never cross the border of the country in which they are
produced [and] ... an average of sixty percent of films distributed in
the [EU] come from the United States."43 MEDIA 95 has tried to im-
prove distribution through several projects. 44 In terms of production,
36 Id. The priorities that were outlined in the 1986 Commission Communication fo-
cused on three areas: distribution, production, and funding. In terms of distribution, the
priorities included:
the development of multilingualism in programs and in films in order to over-
come the language barriers which pose serious practical impediments to the
free movement of creative works [and] the improvement of distribution systems
in order to ensure that European productions obtain a larger share of film and
television showings in the new media.
Id. In terms of production, the priorities included:
an increased collaboration between countries in order to generate the produc-
tion of European works; the rationalization of methods of creation and produc-
tion so as to produce more, and under better conditions; the exploitation of
the film and television heritage through co-productions or using archive mate-
rial [and] the development of new forms of creation using avant garde
techniques.
Id. In terms of funding, the priorities included extending transfrontier risk capital for inno-
vative industrial projects to cultural industries and harmonizing the financial and tax incen-




40 See Collins, supra note 24, at 382-83.




44 Id. The following projects have emerged to boost distribution. The European Film
Distribution Office (EFDO) "sponsor[s] mainly low budget European films." Id. European
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MEDIA 95 has essentially focused on improving production conditions
in order to "facilitate research and development of audiovisual activi-
ties."4 5 Additionally, MEDIA 95 has promoted innovative funding
methods to create new transnational investment mechanisms and new
networks of European suppliers of risk capital. 46
Clearly the most controversial European Union audiovisual policy
is the Television Without Frontiers Directive.47 The Directive essen-
tially requires member states to ensure, where practicable, that broad-
casters reserve a majority proportion of their programming for
European works.48 This majority proportion requirement excludes
time apportioned to news, sporting events, games, advertising, and
teletext services. The Directive also tries to stimulate European in-
dependent producers' production by requiring all broadcasters to re-
serve at least ten percent of their air time or programming budgets for
such works.49 Finally, the Directive prohibits the broadcasting of cin-
Video Area (EVE) "has devised a scheme of advances against receipts to promote the cross
[border] issue and circulation of European works." Id. The Broadcasting Across the Barrier
of European Language (BABEL) project "encourage[s] and promote[s] a multi-lingual ap-
proach to production, post-production, and distribution of European audiovisual works." Id.
45 Id. The following projects have emerged to boost production. "The European Sup-
port for Creative Independent Production Talent (SCRIPT) fund aims to improve the quality
of screen and musical writing in the [Union] by providing support to the development of
fiction script in both television and film production." Id. The European Association of Ani-
mation Film, sometimes called CARTOON, promote[s] the development of animation tech-
niques and studios in Europe. Id. The Memory-Archives-Program project (MAP-TV) "has
created a network between the archive services of European (television] companies [and] film
libraries ... in order to re-use archive films, either in new productions or in rebroadcasts."
Id
46 Id. Although MEDIA Venture, a risk capital fund, and MEDIA Guarantee, a guaran-
tee fund, were created during phase II, the plan is not to renew these forms of assistance. I.
47 See U.S. Requests Consultation on EC TV Broadcast Directive, 66 GATT Focus 3 (1989).
The Television Convention is a European agreement that covers television broadcasting and
likewise contains a local content requirement. The Convention was signed by Union as well
as non-Union European nations.
48 Chapter 111, Article 4 of the Television Without Frontiers Directive provides:
[M]ember States shall ensure where practicable and by appropriate means, that
broadcasters reserve for European works, within the meaning of article 6, a
majority proportion of their transmission time, excluding the time appointed
to news, sports events, games, advertising and teletext services. This propor-
tion, having regard to the broadcaster's informational, educational, cultural
and entertainment responsibilities to its viewing public, should be achieved
progressively, on the basis of suitable criteria.
Directive, supra note 9, art. 4.
The term "European works" in Article 4 is defined in Article 6.1 which provides:
[w]ithin the meaning of this chapter, 'European works' means the following:
(a) works originating from Member States of the Community and, as regards
television broadcasters falling within the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of
Germany, works from German territories where the Basic Law does not apply
and fulfilling the conditions of paragraph 2; (b) works originating from Euro-
pean third states party to the European Convention on Transfrontier Televi-
sion of the Council of Europe and fulfilling the conditions of paragraph 2; (c)
works originating from other European third countries and fulfilling the condi-
tions of paragraph 3.
Id. at art. 6.1.
49 Id. at art. 5.
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ema film until two years after the film's first exhibition, unless the
rights holders and the broadcaster agree otherwise. 50
Around the same time that steps were being taken toward creating
the European Union's comprehensive audiovisual policy framework,
the Uruguay Round negotiations began in Punta del Este, Uruguay.
One of the main goals of the Uruguay Round negotiations was to in-
corporate audiovisuals into the GATT framework.
C. Uruguay Round Negotiations
Shortly after the Uruguay Round negotiations began, the United
States and the European Union started to disagree on the proper clas-
sification of audiovisuals and the proper incorporation of audiovisuals
into the GATT framework. Tensions heightened on September 1,
1989, when the United States, in response to the Television Without
Frontiers Directive, requested bilateral consultations under Article
XXI151 of the GATT with nations that had signed the Television Con-
vention.52 On October 23, 1989, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed a resolution denouncing the Directive's content quota as a vio-
lation of the GAT. 5 3 The United States also lodged a complaint
under Article XXII of the GATT requesting bilateral consultations with
the European Union and threatened to take retaliatory action against
Union exports if quotas were adopted under the Directive. 54
In its defense, the European Union voiced three contentions.
First, the European Union contended that television broadcasting is a
service not covered by the GAFF. 55 Second, the European Union as-
serted that the GAT and general principles of international law rec-
ognized a "cultural exception" that exempted television programming
from the GATT. 56 This defense was based on the notion that certain
cultural products shape a nation's values and traditions.57 Given the
influence of television programming in people's lives, the unregulated
importation of such foreign television programs would risk the erosion
of national traditions and values. 58 Finally, the European Union ar-
gued that the Directive's quota requirement was only politically bind-
ing.59  Therefore, even if the GATT encompassed television
50 Id. at art. 7.
51 See Directive, supra note 9.
52 See U.S. Requests Consultation on EC TV Broadcast Directive, 66 GAIT Focus 3 (1989);
supra note 9 and text accompanying.
53 Smith, supra note 17, at 106; see 135 CONG. REc. H7326-27 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1989).
54 See Smith, supra note 17, at 106.
55 See Filipek, supra note 1, at 350 (quoting Reply to Questions Put Forward by the
American Delegation on the Television Without Frontiers Directive and on the Convention
of the Council of Europe at 4-5 (undated)). At that time, the GATT did not include a serv-
ices provision. See supra note 2.
56 See Filipek, supra note 1, at 351.57ld
58 Id.
59 Id. at 352.
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programming, the quota was merely a goal and was not legally enforce-
able under Union law.60
Despite efforts to resolve the disagreement between the United
States and the European Union over the legitimacy of the Directive,
the first consultation failed to settle the dispute.61 Instead of request-
ing further consultations, the United States chose to resolve the disa-
greement through the Uruguay Round negotiations.
Meanwhile, the Uruguay Round negotiations continued. In 1990,
the Group of Negotiations on Services created a separate audiovisual
sector working group to examine issues surrounding the audiovisual
sector, specifically those relating to broadcasting and films.62 The
draft agreement, produced by the Group of Negotiations on Services,
included i "cultural values exception" that allowed parties to use the
exception to justify a departure from any general trade disciplines.63
The European Union supported a "cultural exception" since "the pro-
tection or promotion of indigenous languages, history, and heritage
depended heavily on national audiovisual output."64 The United
States opposed a "cultural exception" and asserted that cultural iden-
tity was difficult to define given the prevailing tendency toward multi-
national film productions and television programming.65 Each party's
position on the "cultural values exception" was reflected in its respec-
tive draft proposal for a services agreement.66
The general dispute between the United States and the European
Union over audiovisuals escalated on October 5, 1993, when a majority
of European Culture Ministers issued a statement known as the Mons
60 Filipek, supra note 1, at 352.
61 Smith, supra note 17, at 107.
62 See Filipek, supra note 1, at 343; Trade in Services GATT, 73 GATT Focus 10, 10-11
(1990). The issue of television programming and the GATT had been addressed previously
without resolution approximately twenty-five years earlier. The GATT included a series of
provisions aimed at trade in motion pictures. The provisions, which were contained in Arti-
cle IV, permitted contracting nations to establish national "screen quotas" as a way to give
preference to foreign-produced films over domestically-produced films. Article IV consti-
tuted an exception to the basic rule of national treatment set forth in Article III. The GATT
was drafted in a series of conferences from 1946 to 1948, before the widespread use of televi-
sion. In 1961, during the Nineteenth Session of the Contracting Parties, the United States
raised the issue of GAT's applicability to restrictions on television programming. A working
party was established in that year to examine whether the provisions of the GATT dealt with
the problem of market access for television programs and to recommend any action.
Although the working party prepared a number of draft recommendations on this issue, it
was unable to reach a consensus. The matter was eventually dropped. Filipek, supra note 1,
at 343.
63 See Draft: Multilateral Framewor* For Trade in Services, GATT Doc. MTN.GNS/35, art.
XIV (July 23, 1990).
64 Filipek, supra note 1, at 343-44 (quoting Services-Audio-Video Sector Working Group, 75
GATT Focus 10 (1990)).
65 See Filipek, supra note 1, at 344.
66 The European Union's draft proposal explicitly contained a "cultural exception" for
audiovisuals. Id. The United States draft proposal, while acknowledging the principle of
exceptions and reservations, made no provision for an audiovisuals "cultural exception." Id.
at 345.
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Statement. A majority of ministers favored excluding audiovisuals
from any efforts to apply the GATT principle of nondiscrimination and
most-favored-nation status to trade in all services. 67 Although they pre-
ferred an exclusion, they reasoned that the Union could be forced to
maintain its negotiating commitment of seeking special treatment for
the audiovisual sector.68 Therefore, the ministers outlined six mini-
mum objectives69 that would be necessary to ensure that the European
Union would adopt an agreement and that the Union could continue
to assist its audiovisual industry. 70 Ultimately, the long battle between
the United States and the European Union over audiovisuals and the
resulting "agreement to disagree" forcibly removed audiovisuals from
the Uruguay Round negotiations thereby preventing the integration of
audiovisuals into the GAT7.71 This result is significant for several rea-
sons discussed below.
IV. Significance of the Issue
A. Audiovisuals as Cultural Products
The main thrust of the disagreement between the United States
67 EC Culture Ministers Back French Stance on Excluding Films, TV from Trade Talks, Int'l
Trade Daily (BNA) (Oct. 6, 1993) [hereinafter EC Culture]. The GATT principle of nondis-
crimination and most-favored-nation status generally requires that any advantage or privilege
granted by a contracting party to another contracting party with respect to import or export
customs duties, import or export charges, the international transfer of payments for imports
or exports, the means of attaching such charges, all import and export rules, and all matters
referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III of the GATT, must be granted to all other
contracting parties. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, art. I
(Oct. 30, 1950). For a discussion of nondiscrimination and most-favored-nation status, see
Lupinacci, infra note 97, at 132.
68 EC Culture, supra note 67.
69 The minimum objectives had no legal force. They were created to guide the Euro-
pean Union's trade and foreign ministers and the European Commission by spelling out a
specific GATT objective for the audiovisual sector. Suzanne Perry, EC Ministers Outline Trade
Goals for Cinema and TV, REurEms EUR. COMMUNITY RE., Oct. 5, 1993. The six minimum
objectives are as follows:
1. Exemption from the "most favoured nation" clause for programmes to sup-
port the audiovisual sector so that the EC could reserve such programmes
for its own producers.
2. Preservation and development of public finance and operational subsidies.
3. Preservation of the ability to regulate existing and new technology and
transmission methods.
4. Preservation of the freedom to develop all policies and measures designed
to assist the audiovisual sector-founding, production, televising, broad-
casting, distribution, and operation.
5. No requirement for the audiovisual sector to be subject to the principle of
the progressive advancement of liberalisation [as defined in Article 19 of
the draft agreement on services].
6. Preservation of existing EC rules, without priority on the "effective imple-
mentation of the television without frontiers" directive which allows broad-
casters to reserve a majority of air time for European works.
Belgian Minister Pushes GATT Audiovisual Compromise, RxuturEs, Oct. 15, 1993.
70 See EC Culture, supra note 67. The announcement represented a compromise be-
tween a majority of the European countries who wanted a "cultural exception" in the GATT
and the minority who wanted a more flexible approach.
71 See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
COMMERCE VERSUS CULTURE
and the European Union is whether audiovisuals are commercial prod-
ucts or cultural products that deserve special consideration. The Euro-
pean Union has classified audiovisual products as cultural products
which require special treatment. 72 Conversely, the United States has
defined audiovisual products in economic terms and views the audiovi-
sual industry as a commercial venture, pure and simple. 73 Essentially,
the European conviction of having some form of cultural protection-
ism has been pitted against the American conviction that the customer
knows best.74
The European classification of audiovisuals as cultural products
has some basis in fact. Richard Collins, a scholar in the communica-
tions field, has noted that "[t]he audiovisual sector is of great impor-
tance to the cultural identity of peoples, regions and nations."75 Social
scientists agree that mass communications and entertainment serve as
important carriages for cultural information. 76 In many circum-
stances, the mass media's messages can accelerate social change, pro-
mote the adoption of new and different attitudes, and influence
behavior.77
Collins observes that it is easy to "deny the validity of intervention
in markets for cultural productions and to argue that 'culture' simply
provides a convenient and mendacious frosting that conceals protec-
72 The European Parliament noted that culture is notjust another commodity. Uruguay
Round - Parliament Calls for a Cultural Specificity Clause for the Audiovisual Sector, AGENCY EUR.,
July 17, 1993. Jacque Toubon, the French Minister of Culture explained that broadcasting
cannot be considered merely a commercial service, but rather, a public service. Culture Coun-
cil: Weimar and Stockholm to be European Cities of Culture in 1998-1999, EUR. REP. SECT. IV INTER-
NAL REL., No. 1900, Nov. 6, 1993. Toubon noted that Europe must choose between mind
and matter, between art and merchandise. France: No to Coca-Cola Culture, French Minister Says
of GAT Round, REUTERS, Aug. 6, 1993. Such statements embody a number of pervasive as-
sumptions that have supported the regulation of audiovisuals: "[ S] ocieties are held together
solely through a shared culture; free trade and the market do not provide the cultural order
necessary to maintain social cohesion; political authorities must redress market failure; the
mass media, particularly television, are vital agencies in maintaining and reproducing social
cohesion." Collins, supra note 24, at 362.
73 Tom Walker, Hollywood Takes Exception to French Block on the Box, THE TIMES (London),
May 3, 1993. The market and the consumers should be able to operate freely and determine
which audiovisual products should predominate. This conceptualization is evidenced in a
statement by jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture Export Association of America: "I
think the people of Europe, who have the right to choose their own leaders, should have the
right to choose their own television. The audience is king .... Let the market forces collide
and something better" will result. Id.
74 Id.
75 Collins, supra note 24, at 361 (citation omitted). Richard Collins is a member of the
Department of Communication Studies at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. He
is the author of several books on television, including SATELLITE TELEVISION IN WESTERN Eu.
ROPE; TELEVISION, POUCY AND CULTURE; CULTURE, COMMUNICATION, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY-.
THE CASE OF C ANADIAN TELEVISION; and, with Nicholas Garnham and Gareth Locksley, THE
ECONOMICS OF TELEVISION: THE UK CASE.
76 See Smith, supra note 17, at 133; INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF COM-
MUNICATION PROBLEMS, MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD 30 (1980).
77 See Smith, supra note 17, at 133; CONRAD P. KorAK, PRIME-TIME SOCIETY. AN AN-
THROPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF TELEVISION AND CULTURE 10-12 (1990).
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tionist industrial policies,"78 because culture is hard to define. Despite
this observation, Collins emphasizes that "cultural arguments cannot
be dismissed, not least because of the intensity and pervasiveness" with
which they are held by various entities. 79
Although the European Union's classification of audiovisuals has
some basis in fact, the Union's audiovisual trade policies were not en-
acted primarily to protect European culture. Rather, the European
Union's trade policies were enacted primarily to protect the European
audiovisual market from further American domination.
B. The Motive Underlying European Union Audiovisual Trade
Policies
It is somewhat difficult to ascertain the motive underlying Euro-
pean Union audiovisual trade policies. Two factors indicate that the
motive was cultural protection. Four observations indicate that the
motive was trade protection. When the former observations are
weighed against the latter observations, the scale tips in favor of the
latter.
1. Cultural Protection
Two factors indicate that the European Union erected audiovisual
trade barriers and quotas in order to protect its culture. First, cultural
protection is one of the underlying thrusts of the Television Without
Frontiers Directive. In the 1984 Green Paper on the Directive,8 0 the
European Union Commission asserted that "[c ] ross-frontier radio and
television broadcasting would make a significant contribution to Euro-
pean unification."8 1 The European Union assumed that a single
broadcasting market would unify the Union culturally and politically,
thereby assisting in the development of the Union's audiovisual hard-
ware and software industries.82 At that time, a majority of the Euro-
pean Union members accepted the classic nationalist formulation that
"political institutions survive only when they are congruent with cul-
tural communities."83 The Directive was the "most important embodi-
ment of these Community goals."84 If the Union was to survive, it
needed a common culture and a shared identity.
78 Collins, supra note 24, at 363.
79 Id; see Jacques Delors, Address to the Opening of the European Parliament: Commission
Program for 1085, 1985 O.J. (2-324) 64 (Mar. 12, 1985) (Debates of the European Parliament).
80 The European Union Commission, which initiates the harmonization of broadcast-
ing law, presented its position on broadcasting in the 1984 Green Paper entitled Television
Without Frontiers. See Television Without Frontiers: Green Paper on the Establishment of
the Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and Cable, COM(84)300 final
at 1 [hereinafter Green Paper].
81 Collins, supra note 24, at 375 (quoting Green Paper, supra note 80, at 28).
82 Id at 379.




The European Union is not the only body that has invoked cul-
ture as a basis for public policy. Culture has served as a basis for broad-
casting policy in Australia. The Australian Minister of
Communications stated that "[b]roadcasting plays a central role in sus-
taining and developing Australian cultural life. It is a powerful force in
shaping a nation's identity and maintaining a democratic and pluralist
society. Television and radio are an important part of people's lives."8
5
The Canadian government has similarly invoked culture as a basis for
public policy.
The Canadian government has been committed to increasing the
amount of Canadian television drama that its citizenry watches.8 6 This
commitment rests on the notion that citizen viewing of American tele-
vision drama threatens its continued existence as a "separate and in-
dependent" state.8 7 The core assumption is that polity and culture
must be congruent; there can be no political sovereignty without cul-
tural sovereignty.88 In Canada there is a pervasive belief that the key to
the existence of the Canadian nation lies in the leisure habits of its
citizenry.8 9 Therefore, the viewing of non-Canadian television drama
is a destabilizing political force.90 These findings indicate that the Eu-
ropean Union erected its audiovisual trade policies to protect its
culture.
Second, the protectionist audiovisual measures have not worked:
the continued existence of such protectionist measures, in light of
their essential failure, indicates that something else besides economics
may be fueling such measures. That something else may be cultural
protectionism.
Members of the European Union have not responded to the Tele-
vision Without Frontiers Directive with similar amounts of enthusiasm.
Released figures suggest that the Directive has failed and that the
number of American programs shown in Europe has actually increased
since the Directive was drafted in 1984. In 1991, U.S. programs ac-
counted for fifty-four percent of television drama transmitted by Euro-
pean broadcasters, and American subsidiaries generated fifty-one
percent of the video revenues in Europe. 9 1 Anica, the Italian in-
dependent producers' organization, published a report releasing some
85 Id. at 361-62 (quoting Kim Beazley, Address at the Annual Convention of the Federa-
tion of Australian Radio Broadcasters 6 (1990) (transcript produced by the Dep't of Trans-
port and Communications, Canberra, Australia)).
86 Flora MacDonald, a former Canadian minister of communications stated that "a na-
tions's fictional repertoire is the life blood of its culture." RICHARD COLLINS, CULTURE, COM-
MUNICATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY. THE CASE OF CAntIA TELEVISION 226 (1990) (citing
Globe and Mail Feb. 10, 1987, at 12).
87 Id. (citing Globe and Mail at 13).
88 I1&
89 Id.
90 Id. (citing Globe and Mail at 42-43).
91 See Perry, supra note 69.
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telling figures. The report stated that the European audiovisual trade
deficit with the United States was $2.5 billion in 1992.92 In the first
half of the 1980's, approximately twenty-two percent of Europe's televi-
sion programs originated in the United States.93 By 1992, the total
number of hours broadcast had quadrupled and the share of the U.S.
product had increased to thirty-five percent. 94
A statement made by Jacques Toubon, the French Minister of Cul-
ture, also supports this observation: "[tihe Americans . . . want so-
called European protectionism to be dismantled although their trade
surplus since 1988 in the field of film and audiovisual products has
tripled from 1.8 to 4 billion dollars. This proves our system of support
[for the industry] guarantees continued creativity without halting com-
petition. '95 If economics were primarily fueling such measures then
the European Union could have altered its audiovisual policies to bet-
ter protect its audiovisual market.
Although the above two factors are persuasive, they are out-
weighed by the following four observations: European Union cultural
considerations only take rhetorical precedence over economic consid-
erations; the European Union does not have a collective culture to
which audiovisuals can be of great importance; the European Union
has recently stressed cultural diversity; and European leaders' state-
ments suggest that trade policies were not culturally motivated.
2. Protection of Trade
Four observations indicate that the European Union's "protection
of culture" is a facade for audiovisual trade barriers that primarily serve
to protect its audiovisual market from further American dominance.
First, the European Union's cultural considerations only take rhe-
torical precedence over economic and industrial considerations. The
creation of a competitive single market has been the most important
goal of the Union's policies for the audiovisual sector.96 This observa-
tion is evidenced by the European Union's justifications for its audiovi-
sual trade policies. The European Union has not solely or
predominantly justified its audiovisual trade policies in terms of cul-
tural protection. For instance, although some of the discussion regard-
ing the Television Without Frontiers Directive focused on the desire to
preserve a European cultural identity through "the promotion and
support of a trans-European television industry composed of Commu-
nity-produced programming,"97 the 1984 Green Paper itself and sur-
92 See Wohrle, supra note 13.
93 1&
94 Id.
95 See Perry, supra note 69.
96 See Collins, supra note 24, at 370.
97 Timothy M. Lupinacci, The Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities in the European
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rounding discussions indicate that economic protection was the true
rationale for the Directive.
The Green Paper revealed the European Union's justification for
the Television Without Frontiers Directive. The Union's justification
for the Directive has been the free movement of services provided for
in the Treaty of Rome, because it has no authority to regulate broad-
casting.98 The Commission justified the Directive in economic terms
by citing various freedoms that are set out in Articles 55 through 66 of
the Treaty of Rome, including the freedom to provide services. 99 The
Commission characterized broadcasting as "the provision of a service
for remuneration" within the scope of Article 60, thereby entitling
broadcasting to the protection and benefits of the Treaty of Rome. 100
For instance, one benefit of the Treaty of Rome is that a person supply-
ing a broadcasting service could temporarily broadcast in a state under
the same conditions that are imposed by that state on its own
broadcasters.10 1
The Commission drew upon case law of the European Court of
Justice to support its characterization.10 2 In part, the Commission re-
lied upon the Sacchi case. In Sacchi, the European Court ofJustice con-
cluded that a television signal must be regarded as a provision of
services under the Treaty of Rome, in absence of an express provision
to the contrary.' 0 3 The court concluded that "trade in material, sound
recordings, films, apparatus and other products used for the diffusion
of television signals are subject to the rules relating to freedom of
movement for goods" under the Treaty.10 4 Because a television signal
Community: Cultural Preservation or Economic Protectionism ?, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 113, 120
(1991).
98 See Wolfgang Hoffman-Riem, The Broadcasting Activities of the European Community and
Their Implications for National Broadcasting Systems in Europe, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
599, 606-07 (1993).
99 See Filipek, supra note 1, at 327; Treaty of Rome, supra note 25, at arts. 55-66.
100 Filipek, supra note 1, at 327; see Green Paper, supra note 80, at 105-09. Article 60 of
the Treaty of Rome provides:
Services within the meaning of this Treaty shall be deemed to be services
normally supplied for remuneration, to the extent that they are not governed
by the provisions relating to the free movement of goods, capital and persons.
Services shall include in particular:
(a) activities of an industrial character;
(b) activities of a commercial character;
(c) artisan activities; and
(d) activities of the liberal professions.
Without prejudice to the provisions of the Chapter relating to the right of
establishment, a person supplying a service may, in order to carry out that ser-
vice, temporarily exercise his activity in the state where the service is supplied,
under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 25, at art. 60.
101 See supra note 100.
102 Green Paper, supra note 80, at 105-09 (citing Case 155/73, Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. 409
(1974)).
103 Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 427.
104 &
19941
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
was a provision of a service under the Treaty, the Directive fell within
the European Union's regulatory powers.
Discussions surrounding the Green Paper also indicate that eco-
nomic protectionism was the true rationale for the Directive. In its
"Opinion on the Green Paper," the European Commission's Economic
Social Committee urged the creation of an efficient European televi-
sion industry so that European producers could compete with Ameri-
can producers. 10 5 Moreover, subsequent Parliamentary discussions
display resentment toward American dominance in the audiovisual
field. 10 6 For instance, Parliamentary Representative De Vries stated:
"there are four things we want-to guarantee the diversity of cultures
and their identity,- to guarantee pluralism of expression, to protect
copyright and to avoid an influx of cheap productions, primarily from
the USA-and I have no hesitation in talking about American cast-offs
here."10 7 This statement perfectly embodies such resentment.
Second, because the European Union does not have a "collective
culture," its audiovisual sector cannot be of great importance to its cul-
tural identity. Rather, the audiovisual sector is of great importance to
the individual identity of each member nation respectively. This obser-
vation tends to undermine the Union's position that its audiovisual
policies were created to protect "its" culture. The MEDIA 92 pro-
gram' 0 8 itself shows this.
The MEDIA 92 Directive looked toward the formation of the sin-
gle market in 1992. The program was passed in response to the per-
ceived threat of a single market dominated by English speaking
countries.10 9 Therefore, the MEDIA program promotes cultural plu-
ralism by encouraging circulation of community productions (espe-
cially those in minority languages)." 0 Although the MEDIA program
promotes cultural pluralism, that fact does not mandate that a "collec-
tive culture" exists in the European Union.. In fact, prior to the ME-
DIA program, around eighty percent of each members' audiovisual
products did not leave its respective border.' This observation indi-
cates that the European Union does not have a "collective culture."
Rather, each member state has its own distinct culture.
Third, the Union has recently stressed cultural diversity, rather
than cultural unity, in the context of the Television Without Frontiers
Directive. In response to criticism of its stance in the 1984 Green Pa-
105 Id
106 See Lupinacci, supra note 97, at 121-22.
107 Id at 121 n.41 (quoting Debates of the European Parliament, Pursuit of BroadcastingActivi-
ties, 1989 O.J. (C 378) 2, 119).
108 See supra text accompanying note 36.
109 See Collins, supra note 24, at 382.
110 Id at 383.




per, the European Union Commission now emphasizes the impor-
tance of cultural independence and diversity among member nations,
although this concern is not listed in the specific regulations.112
Fourth, the protectionist statements of European leaders also indi-
cate that the true motive underlying the European Union's audiovisual
trade policies is economic protection. Several statements, some made
in conjunction with the preamble to the Green Paper, suggest that the
Directive was not solely culturally motivated. 113 European Union pol-
icy-makers stated that they had been swamped by U.S. exports and that
what was left of the European audiovisual sector was an endangered
species in need of protection.11 4 Audiovisual Commissioner Joao de
Deus Pinheiro stated: "we must have assurances that we can give the
audiovisual sector in Europe the possibility to breathe-not to domi-
nate, unfortunately, but to breathe."1 5 Jacques Delors, the current
President of the European Commission, stated: "the culture industry
will tomorrow be one of the biggest industries, a creator of wealth and
jobs.... We have to build a powerful European culture industry that
will enable us to be in control of both the medium and its content."116
Similar utterances can be found elsewhere, making it clear that the
roots of some national regulations lie in economic protectionism.
In sum, the European Union uses the rhetoric of cultural protec-
tion as a facade for audiovisual trade barriers that primarily serve to
protect its audiovisual market from further American dominance.
Even if the European Union had actually enacted such audiovisual
trade barriers in the name of "cultural protection," it has no legal au-
thority to do so.
C. The European Union's Legal Authority to Enact Trade Policies in
the Name of Culture
The European Union does not have the jurisdiction nor the au-
thority to determine the scope of its regulatory powers' 1 7 because the
Union's regulatory powers are limited to those enumerated in the
Treaty of Rome." 8 The Treaty of Rome does not contain a section
that specifically gives the Union powers to address cultural issues or
powers to regulate in the name of culture." 9 However, the Treaty of
Rome does contain a generic necessary powers provision.
Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome affords the European Union
112 Hoffman-Riem, supra note 98, at 611-12.
113 Id. at 612; The Green Paper preamble states: "whereas coordination is nevertheless
needed to make it easier for persons and industries producing programmes having a cultural
objective to take up and pursue their activities." Green Paper, supra note 80.
114 See Wohrle, supra note 13.
115 See Perry, supra note 69.
116 See Collins, supra note 24, at 363.
117 Hoffman-Riem, supra note 98, at 604.
118 Id.
119 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 23.
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generic necessary powers to effectuate objectives if such powers were
not explicitly mentioned in the Treaty.120 If such a situation arises,
article 235 provides that the "Council shall, acting unanimously on a
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the assembly, take
the appropriate measures" to create such powers.1 21
On its face, article 235 seems to enable the European Union to
attain the necessary powers to effectuate cultural objectives because
such powers are not explicitly mentioned in the Treaty. But, the Euro-
pean Union is predominantly an economic community (even though
its activities are not restricted solely to the economy) 122 and culture is
an "activity" that is only partly, if at all, determined by economics.1 23
Therefore, culture lies in a borderline area of the European Union's
regulatory jurisdiction. 124
Some member states, within the European Union, pushed for the
revision of the Treaty of Rome in order to avoid such inhibiting effects
and to act effectively in the cultural sphere. 125 The Union had to give
itself "the appropriate means to carry through an ambitious cultural
policy, capable of stimulating cinematographic creation and the propa-
gation of European films throughout Europe." 126 Such efforts
culminated in the inclusion of a Culture Article in the Maastricht
Treaty on Political Union.127
Although the Maastricht Treaty's culture provision would legiti-
mize the creation of cultural initiatives in the audiovisual sector, the
Treaty did not come into effect until November 1, 1993, a long time
after many of the Union's current audiovisual trade policies had been
enacted.1 28 Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty cannot serve as ajustifi-
cation for the current audiovisual trade policies which are defended in
the name of cultural protection. Moreover, the recent Treaty cannot
justify any of the European Union's positions during the Uruguay
Round negotiations because no action has been taken by the Commit-
tee of Regions under Article 198a. 129 The Committee membership was
selected only recently and the first inaugural meeting of the Commit-
120 Id.
121 Id. at art. 235.
122 Hoffman-Riem, supra note 98, at 605. This is true because "economic integration is




125 See Collins, supra note 24, at 370-71.
126 Scriptwriters, Directors and Producers of Cinematographic Works Call for Enquiry into US.
Trade Practices, AGENCY EUR., Nov. 18, 1992.
127 See Collins, supra note 24, at 371.
128 For example, the Television Without Frontiers Directive became effective in 1991.
See supra note 9. The MEDIA program became effective in 1986. See supra note 36 and ac-
companying text.
129 See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
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tee opened on March 9, 1994.130
Even if the European Union had actually enacted audiovisual
trade barriers in the name of "cultural protection," the policies would
be void since the Union has no legal authority to enact such initiatives.
This fact affects the measures that the United States could employ to
resolve its audiovisuals dispute with the European Union.
D. Measures to End the Audiovisuals Dispute
The United States could employ several measures to finally resolve
its audiovisuals dispute with the European Union.1 31 First, the United
States could further pursue unresolved bilateral negotiations regarding
the Television Without Frontiers Directive. Second, the United States
could push for a definitive resolution of whether television program-
ming falls within the scope of Article IV under the GAT[. Finally, the
United States could take action under section 301 of the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 against the European Union.
If faced with the above three choices, the United States should settle
the unresolved bilateral negotiations regarding the Television Without
Frontiers Directive and pursue a definitive resolution of the scope of
130 Committee of the Regions Opens Inaugural Meeting, AGENCY EUR., Mar. 10, 1994.
131 The following measures and analysis are suggested if the United States decides to
take action before the new GATT becomes effective. The new GATr agreement, which is
comprised of a World Trade Organization and Multilateral Trade Agreements attached
thereto, was formally signed by each participant in Marrakech, Morocco, on April 15, 1994.
James K. Glassman, Silliness About Sovereignty Threatens a Good Trade Dea4 THE WASHINGTON
POST, May 4, 1994, at DI. The new agreement will not become effecitve until and only after
each participant approves the Urnguay Round results and a Ministerial Conference on Im-
plementation determines the date on which the agreement will enter into effect. Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round) Document MTN/FA, of December 15, 1993 and
Add.1 of December 15, 1993, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1, 3 (1994).
If the United States does not act before the implementation of the new GATT then the
measures that it could employ become less exact. Article II:4 of the World Trade Agreement
provides that the GATT in Annex 1A is legally distinct from the GATT dated October 30,
1947 as amended. l at 3-4. Noting this provision, Director-General Sutherland has stated
that the World Trade Organization "will not be a succesor agreement to GATT, as defined in
the Vienna Convention"; insofar as nations that accept the World Trade Organization Agree-
ment and do not simultaneously withdraw their application of GAIT 1947 under the Proto-
col of Provisional Appliction, they will be bound by two separate most-favored-nation clauses
applying to two different commitments and countries. Ild. The United States, European
Union and other nations have already expressed that their intention is to discontinue provi-
sional application of GATT 1947 under the World Trade Organization system. Id.
Despite not knowing the outcome of this ambiguity, the United States could pursue
three avenues for certain, if it chooses to act after the new agreement becomes effective.
First, the United States could enter into bilateral negotiations with the European Union
under the framework of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes in the new agreement. Id. at 114. Second, the United States could still
recognize the factual existence of the Directive and attempt to gain concessions on some of
its more flexible provisions. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text. Third, the United
States could still pursue a section 301 action under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988 as described below. See infra notes 154-62 and accompanying text. Faced with
these three choices, the United States should pursue the first and second but not the third
for the same reasons outlined below.
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Article IV under the GATT.132
1. Bilateral Negotiations
The United States could reopen unresolved bilateral negotiations
regarding the Television Without Frontiers Directive. 13 3 To accom-
plish this, the United States could take one of two approaches. The
United States could lodge another complaint under Article XXII134 of
the GATT requesting bilateral consultations with the European
Union.1 3 5 Alternatively, the United States could recognize the factual
existence of the Directive and attempt to gain concessions on some of
its more flexible provisions.1 36
The United States has unsuccessfully pursued the first approach in
the past. In 1989, the United States lodged a complaint under Article
XX11 137 of the GATT requesting bilateral consultations with the Euro-
pean Union.1 38 Despite efforts to resolve the disagreement between
the United States and the European Union over the legitimacy of the
Television Without Frontiers Directive, the first consultation failed.1 39
Instead of requesting further consultations, the United States chose to
resolve the disagreement through the Uruguay Round negotiations.
Since the disagreement was not resolved in the Uruguay Round negoti-
ations, the United States could reassert its prior contentions and have
the GATT framework determine if the Directive is legitimate.
Given its past experience with negotiations, the United States may
prefer to take a new approach by working within the framework of the
Directive. For instance, the majority proportion requirement, ensur-
ing that broadcasters reserve a majority proportion of their program-
ming for European works, 140  is susceptible to a flexible
interpretation. 14 1 The United States could push for an interpretation
requiring that the majority proportion quota be administered on a na-
tionwide basis. 142 The adoption of such a flexible interpretation would
mean that some channels could have a minority proportion of Euro-
pean programming so long as others had more than a majority propor-
132 See Filipek, supra note 1, at 368.
133 See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
134 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
135 See Smith, supra note 17, at 106.
136 See Filipek, supra note 1, at 368.
137 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
138 See Smith, supra note 17, at 106.
139 1I at 107.
140 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
141 See Filipek, supra note 1, at 368. Another flexible aspect of the Directive is that the
majority proportion rule must be used "where practicable and by appropriate means." Id.
This language can be interpreted broadly in contexts where it is not practicable to devote a
majority of programming to European works. I This is especially true because the "where





tion of European programming.' 43 Although the Commission has
given the provision the most restrictive interpretation by stating that
the majority proportion quota should be applied to each broadcaster
and " [w] here an organization has several different channels, these will
be considered individually," 144 the Commission cannot adopt binding
acts relating to the interpretation of the Directive since the Directive is
not legally binding.145
Using either approach, the United States should further pursue
the unresolved bilateral negotiations regarding the Television Without
Frontiers Directive. 146 The United States should pursue this avenue
because the issue has been partially addressed and left unresolved; the
United States would not be starting from scratch. Moreover, pursuing
this avenue under either approach is only a mildly confrontational re-
sponse to the failure to include audiovisuals in the GATT. The Euro-
pean Union would be less likely to react negatively since the issue has
been partially addressed before.
2. Resolution of the Scope of Article IV of the GATT
In addition to pursuing unresolved bilateral negotiations regard-
ing the Directive, the United States could push for a definitive resolu-
tion of whether television programming falls within the scope of
Article IV of the GATT and its cinema exception.
The United States raised this issue during the Nineteenth Session
of the Contracting Parties.1 47 A working party was established to ex-
amine whether the provisions of the GATT dealt with the problem of
market access for television programs and to recommend any ac-
tion.148 Although the working party prepared a number of draft rec-
ommendations on this issue, it was unable to reach a consensus.1 49
The matter was eventually dropped.
The United States could reassert the position that contracting par-
ties to the GATT should be allowed to use screen quotas for domestic
television programs, provided that the quotas do not "preclude access
to a reasonable proportion of viewing time for recorded programs im-
ported from other contracting parties .... -150 However, the premises
143 Id.
144 Filipek, supra note 1, at 332 (quoting Reply to Questions Put Forward by the Ameri-
can Delegation on the Television Without Frontiers Directive and on the Convention of the
Council of Europe at 4 (undated) (on file at the Directorate General for External Relations of
the EC Commission)).
145 See Filipek, supra note 1, at 368.
146 See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 62.
148 Filipek, supra note 1.
149 Id.
150 See Filipek, supra note 1, at 364 (quoting Application of GATT to International Trade in
Television Programmes: Revised United States Draft Recommendation, GATT Doc. L/1908, 2 (Nov.
10, 1962) (unpublished document on file at the GATT Information and Media Relations Divi-
sion in Geneva)).
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underlying a reassertion would have to be revised due to the changes
in the television programming market since 1961. For instance, the
United States could no longer contend that market pressures would be
insufficient to prevent contracting parties from restricting imports and
would be insufficient until there were more competitive television sta-
tions available to the viewer. 151
Despite having to change its premises, the United States should
raise the issue of whether television programming falls within the
scope of the Article IV and request a working party to definitively re-
solve the issue.15 2 The United States should pursue this course of ac-
tion because a positive determination would provide the means to
shoehorn television programming into the GATr framework. More-
over, the European Union's former objection, that the guarantee of
access would establish unacceptable GATT obligations upon con-
tracting parties, could no longer be maintained due to the drastic
changes in the audiovisual market.153
In addition to seeking a definitive resolution of the scope of Arti-
cle IV of the GATT, the United States could initiate a section 301 ac-
tion against the European Union.
3. Section 301 Action
The United States could challenge European Union audiovisual
policies, specifically the Television Without Frontiers Directive, by tak-
ing action under section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988.154 This section authorizes the President to
151 See Filipek, supra note 1, at 364; Application of GATT to International Trade in Television
Programmes: Statement Made by the United States Representative on 21 November 1961, GATT Doc.
L/1646, 4 (Nov. 26, 1961) (unpublished document on file at the GATT Information and
Media Relations Division in Geneva).
152 See Filipek, supra note 1, at 363.
153 See Working Party on Application of GATT to International Trade in Television Programmes,
GATT Doc. L/1686, 4 (Mar. 13, 1962) (unpublished document on file at the GATT Informa-
tion and Media Relations Division in Geneva).
154 Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 provides in part:
(a) Mandatory action
(1) If the United States Trade Representative determines ... that
(A) the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are
being denied; or
(B) an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country
(i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provision of, or otherwise
denies benefits to the United States under, any trade agree-
ment, or
(ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States
commerce;
the Trade Representatives shall take action authorized in subsection
(c) of this section subject to the specific direction, if any, of the Presi-
dent regarding any such action, and shall take all other appropriate
and feasible action within the power of the President that the Presi-
dent may direct the Trade Representative to take under this subsec-
tion, to enforce such rights or to obtain the elimination of such act,
policy, or practice.
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implement action against other nations that engage in unfair trade
practices adversely affecting U.S. trade in goods or services.1 55 This
provision also gives the United States Trade Representative the discre-
tionary authority to take action when "an act, policy, or practice of a
foreign country is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or re-
stricts United States commerce." 15 6 Under this section, the United
States could place quantitative restrictions on European Union im-
ports or increase duties levied against the European Union.' 57
If the United States were to initiate a section 301 challenge, an
economic study would have to be completed first. That study would
quantify the burden placed upon the United States by the European
Union's unfair trade practices by comparing the "competitiveness of
the United States industry effected to similar export performances in
other markets, the extent of the effect on trade by the alleged unfair
practice, and the historical presence of the effected industry in the
market concerned." 158 Once the study was done, a public hearing
would be held before a section 301 committee where the European
Union could present its views and the United States could ascertain the
potential harm any retaliatory measures would have on the audiovisual
industry.' 59
Thereafter, the United States Trade Representative would outline
the products and services exported by the European Union to the
United States in order to determine where retaliatory measures would
be most effective.160 When the section 301 committee agreed on the
course of trade retaliation, a proclamation would be drafted which the
White House would review.' 6 ' Under section 301, the United States
Trade Representative could then take action directly.
The United States should not pursue a section 301 challenge
against any of the European Union's audiovisual trade policies. The
European Union has expressed resentment toward section 301 chal-
lenges and has warned that any unilateral action by the United States
under this section could "easily be mirrored by equivalent action
against United States exports."162 Although the European Union au-
diovisual trade policies are protectionist, they do not hurt United
States audiovisual exports so much that it would be worth risking a
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 301 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 24!1 (a) (1988
& Supp. IV 1992)).
155 Lupinacci, supra note 97, at 143.
156 Id. at 144 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).




161 Id. at 146.
162 Id. (quoting Philips, The New Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988: Trade Wars or Open Markets?, 22 VA~N. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 491, 526 (1989) (citing 133
CONG. REc. H2760 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987) (statement of Rep. Crane)).
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trade war. The outcome of a trade war may be potentially more dam-
aging than the effects of the current audiovisual policies.
V. Conclusion
Now that dust is beginning to settle on the Uruguay Round nego-
tiations table, the significance of excluding audiovisuals from the final
GATT agreement has become clear: Non-authorized, protectionist Eu-
ropean Union audiovisual trade policies remain intact to the disadvan-
tage of all non-Union member countries.
Further negotiations must ensue to resolve the audiovisuals dis-
pute between the United States and the European Union, thereby en-
abling audiovisuals to be incorporated into a globally-managed
framework. As outlined above, the United States could employ several
measures to accomplish these goals. First, the United States could fur-
ther pursue unresolved bilateral negotiations regarding the legitimacy
of the Television Without Frontiers Directive. Second, the United
States could push for a definitive resolution of whether television pro-
gramming falls within the scope of Article IV under the GATT. Finally,
the United States could pursue a section 301 challenge under' the Om-
nibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 against European Union
audiovisual trade policies.
The most effective and least risky path for the United States to
follow is to settle the unresolved bilateral negotiations regarding the
Television Without Frontiers Directive and to reach a definitive resolu-
tion of whether television programming falls within the scope of Arti-
cle IV under the GATT. This path is desirable for two reasons.
First, negotiations would be less confrontational than initiating a
section 301 challenge. A section 301 challenge would be met with Eu-
ropean resentment and could lead to an audiovisuals trade war. As
discussed above, the European Union has expressed resentment to-
ward section 301 challenges and has warned that any unilateral action
by the United States under this section could be mirrored by equal
action against United States exports. 163 Due to its potentially volatile
nature, a section 301 challenge should only be initiated as a last resort.
Second, negotiations are especially desirable because the Euro-
pean Union audiovisual trade policies, although they are protectionist,
do not paralyze United States audiovisual exports. As discussed above,
European Union audiovisual trade policies have generally been unsuc-
cessful. In the early 1980's, approximately twenty-two percent of Eu-
rope's television programs originated in the United States. 164 By 1992,
when the entire number of hours broadcast had quadrupled com-
pared to ten years earlier, the proportion of the United States product
163 Lupinacci, supra note 97, at 146.
164 See Wohrle, supra note 13.
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had increased to thirty-five percent.165 The outcome of a trade war
may be potentially more damaging than the effects of the current Eu-
ropean Union audiovisual policies.
However, if bilateral negotiations regarding the Television With-
out Frontiers Directive and attempts to reach a definitive resolution of
the scope of Article IV fail, the United States may have no other alter-
native but to pursue a section 301 challenge. Lodging a section 301
challenge would forcefully assert that protectionist trade barriers will
no longer be tolerated.
LIsA L. GARRIETr
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